Data aggregation is a fundamental and efficient algorithm to reduce the communication overhead and energy consumption in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). However, WSNs need both energy-efficient and privacy-preserving when being deployed in an unprotected area. In this paper, we propose an energy-efficient and privacy-preserving data aggregation algorithm CBDA (the chain-based data aggregation). In the CBDA, sensor nodes will be organized as a tree topology. The leaf nodes of the tree sequentially reconnect with each other to form many chain topologies. For assuring data privacy, after data gathering, (1) the tail nodes (the nodes which on the tail of chain) need to slice their sensing data into J fragments. One fragment is kept by themselves, and they distribute the J −1 data fragments to their neighbor nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are deployed in monitoring environment and consist of a large number of tiny sensor nodes with data sensing, wireless transmission, and computing capabilities. WSNs have been widely applied to many applications, including the Internet of Things (IoT), social networks, medical treatment, etc. After being deployed, sensor nodes need to gather data from their surrounding area and transmit the data back to the base station via the routing topology.
The sensor nodes have limitations on energy, computation, and storage because of the uncomplicated architecture and limited resources. How to mitigate the influence of the aforementioned constraints on WSNs is a critical problem. Meanwhile, due to the features of wireless communication, the privacy of sensing data is vulnerable. An adversary can easily eavesdrop on network traffic and obtain the primitive data. Driven by these, privacy-preserving data aggregation algorithms were proposed.
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There exist many solutions in privacy-preserving data aggregation. Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe(SMART) [1] algorithm is based on slicing-mixing technology. In the SMART, sensor nodes organize themselves into a tree topology and slice their own sensing data into a fixed number of fragments. One fragment is saved by themselves and send the rest of the fragments to their neighbor nodes for data privacy. However, extra data fragment exchanges rapidly drain node's energy and lessen the lifetime of WSNs. For energy-efficient, ESMART [2] algorithm was proposed. Because the sensing data of a non-leaf node will merge with the data from its child nodes during data aggregation, it merely performs the data slicing on the leaf nodes. Nevertheless, the number of leaf nodes in a tree topology is still large, which causes the energy consumption of data fragments exchange is also high. Moreover, decreasing the number of sliced nodes incurs higher data leakage risk. Thus, how to provide effective privacy-preserving without prohibitive energy consumption is a challenge for devising the aggregation algorithm.
In this paper, we propose an energy-efficient and privacy-preserving data aggregation algorithm CBDA (the chain-based data aggregation). It consists of three phases: (1) The topology formation phase, we establish a tree aggregation topology and further organize the leaf nodes of the tree to form many chain topologies. ( 2) The slicing-merging phase, only the tail nodes (the nodes which on the tail of chain) slice their data into J fragments (which is a blend of fake fragments and real fragments), they keep one real fragment, and foremost send the remainder (J − 1) to other tail nodes within their communication range. If a tail node had received k fragments before executing data slicing, it only demands to slice its data into J − k fragments. After finish fragments distribution, each node discards the fake fragments and merges all real fragments they received. ( 3) The aggregation phase, tail nodes merely transmit their data to the parent node. Each non-tail node aggregates the aggregation data from the child nodes with its own data, and then the new aggregation data is also transmitted to its parent node. After transferring in turn along the paths of topology, all aggregation data reach the base station (BS).
Compared with previous works, our algorithm accomplishes the following contributes:
(1) We propose a hybrid privacy-preserving algorithm by utilizing the data slicing technology and fake fragments. For the data privacy of a node, the adversaries need to break n links belong to this node and correctly distinguish the fake fragments. Also, our algorithm can resist the untrusted aggregator, even if the aggregator colludes with k (k ≤ n − 1) malicious nodes.
(2) Compared with the existing schemes, we significantly reduce the communication overhead and energy consumption, which is consumed by the privacy preservation protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related work; we present some preliminaries and models in Section 3. In Section 4, we illustrate the proposed algorithm CBDA in detail. After providing simulation results and analysis in Section 5, we summarize the paper and give our future work in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
There are extensive privacy-preserving aggregation algorithms, which provide privacy preservation in various scenarios. In this section, we discuss the privacy-preserving algorithms which are divided into two categories: (1) multiparty computation-based algorithms, (2) homomorphic encryption algorithms.
A. MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION-BASED ALGORITHMS
He et al. proposed Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA) and Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART) algorithm in [1] . In the CPDA algorithm, all nodes are deployed in clusters, and they leverage the algebraic properties of polynomials to assure data confidentiality. The SMART algorithm is based on slicing-mixing technology. For data privacy, each node slices its raw data into a fixed number of fragments, and sends the fragments to its neighbor nodes ( Fig. 1 shows the process in detail). However, these two algorithms are both have costly energy consumption and communication overhead as the nodes need to communicate with each other frequently. Nevertheless, performing data slicing on non-leaf nodes is unnecessary because their raw data will mix with the data from their child nodes. Accordingly, Wang et al. [3] and Li and Liu [2] respectively put forward the PECDA scheme and the ESMART scheme. They only execute data slicing on leaf nodes as a safeguard against intruders. Zhang et al. [4] proposed a BPDA scheme, which designs a balance slicing model to enhance the protection of the low secure level nodes. Zhang et al. [5] presented multi-functional secure data aggregation MODA, which encodes raw data into well-defined vectors to provide value-preservation. In [6] , SDAACA scheme was proposed. It can prevent both Sinkhole and Sybil attacks by slicing the raw data into small pieces. Sen and Maitra [7] presented an improved algorithm that is based on CPDA. It makes the computation more efficient. Hua et al. proposed ASSDA protocol in [8] . ASSDA dynamically selects the size of the data fragments, which improves the performance of data slicing. SriVenkateswaran and Sivakumar et al. [9] proposed a cluster-based data aggregation that removes the duplicate data and protects secure transmission by elliptic curve cryptography(ECC). Reference [10] proposed a novel secure data aggregation based on concealed data aggregation and data slicing. It enables the aggregators to detect malicious behaviors, yet it consumes more energy on the process of data retrieval.
B. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS
Girao et al. proposed a concealed data aggregation (CDA) algorithm [11] based on symmetric homomorphic encryption; each node can directly aggregate the encrypted data. However, each node in CDA shares a common key, which leads to severe security problems of the global network if one node is compromised. Castelluccia et al. [12] proposed an algorithm based on one-time pad to improve the CDA. However, this algorithm requires additional information in transmission to guarantee data accuracy, which increases the communication overhead. Prema [13] presented a method that the messages of the network are encrypted with the proposed full homomorphic encryption scheme to reinforce the security and reduce the consumption. Zhang et al. [14] put forward an efficient data aggregation algorithm with XOR homomorphic encryption and the technique of probabilistic coding. Chim et al. [15] utilized Paillier homomorphic encryption and the bloom filters to proposed an aggregation scheme. Cheon et al. [16] adopted homomorphic cryptography, which removes risks on the management of the secret key. Therefore, eliminating the requirement to encrypt and decrypt the message within the network. [17] proposed a novel scheme by the Gamma distribution and homomorphic encryption. This scheme ensures that the eavesdroppers and aggregators are unable to obtain the exact data of each user during aggregation. Ding et al. introduced the homomorphic encryption to reduce the overhead of encryption/decryption operations in [18] . It enhances security and even against quantum computation. Kapusta et al. [19] proposed AHEF scheme, it replaces additively homomorphic secret sharing used in current techniques with additively homomorphic fragmentation. This modification reduces the data volume and energy consumption.
The multiparty computation-based algorithms are lightweight and easy to deploy. However, a vast number of them yield immense communications among sensor nodes, which induces high communication overhead and quickly exhausts the energy of sensors. As for homomorphic encryption algorithms, they provide a good performance of data privacy without decryption. Nevertheless, homomorphic encryption protocols do not perform the effect they should have in practice due to the heavy computational load.
Different from the previous works, our algorithm significantly reduces the communication overhead and energy consumption while maintaining effective privacy preservation.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, a WSN consists of one BS and N sensor nodes, which are scattered throughout the network area. BS has infinite energy and computing power. Each sensor node is stationary in the network and has its unique identifier (ID). Meanwhile, each node can perceive its residual energy. Fig. 2 illustrates the BS launches the data query to the global network, then the sensor nodes gather the sensing data periodically from their surrounding area and send data to the parent node. A parent node further aggregates the data of its child nodes and transmits new aggregation data to its parent node either. This paper aims at sum aggregation because other aggregation functions like average and variance can be converted from the sum. 
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this paper, the adversary model is the ''semi-honest model'' [20] . The characteristics of this model can be concluded as follows: (1) An adversary continuously eavesdrops on the network traffic and does not subjectively terminate the eavesdropping at any time; (2) An adversary inclines to obtain the private data of sensor nodes; (3) An adversary is unable to modify the value of the data. We assume the sensor nodes that in the network are untrusted; nonetheless, there is no extra data they can receive (or gather) except the data they are authorized to know. Adversaries can collude on some malicious nodes to infer the primitive data of other nodes via the keys and data possessed by these malicious nodes.
C. KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME
The pre-distribution key mechanism provides a suitable balance between storage load and processing ability, which is regarded as the most appropriate mechanism for WSNs [21] . Many key management protocols had proposed, such as [22] - [24] . In this paper, we use random key management [25] . It includes three phases: (1) The pre-distribution phase, a total key pool K is generated; each node randomly selects k keys out of the pool without replacement to generate its keyring. (2) The shared-key discovery phase establishes the security links between two nodes if they hold a common key. (3) The path-key establishment phase, a set of sensor nodes that do not have the common keys can establish security links, as long as the multi-link paths of shared keys exist among their neighbor nodes. By utilizing [25] , we denote that the probability of at least one common key exists in any two nodes is P connect , and the probability of the third party also has that key is P overhear . Accordingly,
(2)
IV. CBDA ALGORITHM
In this section, we establish the proposed algorithm CBDA. We first describe the basic idea of the CBDA and then explain its three phases in detail. Last, we introduce the mechanism of fake fragments.
A. THE BASIC IDEA OF CBDA
In this paper, we propose an energy-efficient and privacypreserving data aggregation algorithm CBDA. It consists of three phases.
(1) The topology formation phase: As Fig. 3 (a) shows, the CBDA builds a tree topology. Each parent node(e.g., node 1) chooses one of its leaf child node(e.g., node 7) as a starting point to construct a chain topology(e.g., 7 → 6 → 5 → 3). After each leaf node is involved in this phase, the final topology is formed as shown in Fig. 3(b) .
(2) The slicing-merging phase: Only the tail nodes (e.g., node 3,10,11) slice their data into a certain number of data fragments (including fake and real fragments), which will be encrypted and transmitted to their neighbor nodes later. In the merging phase, after a node receives all the data fragments which are sent to it, that node eliminates fake fragments and merges remains to obtain a merged result.
(3) The aggregation phase: Each tail node transmits the aggregation data to its parent node. Each non-tail node aggregates its data with the aggregation data from its child nodes and transmits the result to the parent node either. Eventually, all aggregation data will reach the BS.
Take the network of Fig. 3 as an example. We suppose the number of data fragments J is 3. In the SMART algorithm, 11 nodes need 11 * (3 − 1) = 22 times of data fragments exchange. Its variants (such as [2] , [3] ) need 8 nodes to execute data slicing, which incurs 8 * (3 − 1) = 16 times of data fragments exchange. In the CBDA, we suppose each tail node would not receive any data fragments before slicing. Hence, the CBDA has 3 nodes(node 3,10,11) to perform data slicing and merely yield 3 * (3 − 1) = 6 times of fragments exchange, which significantly reduces the communication overhead and energy consumption.
B. THE DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF CBDA
In this section, we elaborate on the complete implementation process of CBDA algorithm and the mechanism of fake fragments.
1) THE TOPOLOGY FORMATION PHASE
The topology formation phase consists of two small phases:(1) the tree-building phase and (2) the chains-building phase.
a: THE TREE-BUILDING PHASE
Usually, the BS can be seen as the root of a tree topology. Hence, the BS broadcasts ''Invite'' messages to its neighbor nodes at first. Any node without parent node should reply ''Join'' message to BS after they receive the ''Invite'' message. Upon receiving a ''Join'' message, BS accepts the sender to be its child node by replying the message of ''Accept.'' The child nodes of BS repeat the above process to continue the establishment of tree topology. However, If a node receives more than one ''Invite'' message, it should randomly choose its parent node. Fig. 4 describes the procedure of formatting a tree topology.
b: THE CHAINS-BUILDING PHASE
This phase only executes on the leaf nodes. At first, each non-leaf node(e.g., node 1, 5, 2) will send a ''NL''(non-leaf) message to its parent node. The parent nodes figure out their set of leaf child nodes (S Leaf ). Then the parent node randomly selects a node in its S Leaf by sending a ''Start'' message. The selected node is the first member on the new chain and can be regarded as the tail of the chain (i.e., tail node). Subsequently, that tail node broadcasts the messages of ''Chain'' to its adjacent nodes. Each tail node stops broadcasting until it finds a node to be its child node (merely needs one child), its child node will become the new tail node to repeat the above procedure. Meanwhile, the tail node is the most energy-consuming role in the network. In order to avoid selecting the node with less residual energy as the tail node, the selection of each new tail node depends on the energy level. In detailed, after a leaf node receives the ''Chain'' message, it will reply to the ''Join'' message along with its residual energy. When the temporary tail node receives more than one ''Join'' message, it chooses the node which has the lowest residual energy. Therefore, the node with the highest residual energy would become the real tail node in the end. Fig. 5 presents an example of this phase. After the parent nodes obtain their S leaf , they randomly choose a leaf child node to send ''Start'' message(node 1 → 3, node 5 → 10, node 2 → 9). Upon receiving the ''Start'' message, node 1,10,9 immediately broadcast ''Chain'' messages to their neighbor nodes. A ''Chain'' message includes a variable ID, which represents the first member node's parent on the chain. For instance, the ''Chain'' message of node 3 is [(ID:1), . . . ]. Any leaf node that (1) receives the ''Chain'' message and (2) its parent node's ID equals the ID in the ''Chain'' message should respond to the sender with the ''Join'' message (which includes its residual energy). In Fig. 5 Node 3 receives the ''Join'' message from node 4 and replies it with the ''Accept'' message. After that, a new parent-child relation between node 3 and node 4 is established, node 3 stops broadcasting and makes no response to any ''Chain'' message that it might for each l j ∈ S leaf do 5: if l j ∈ tempset then 6: continue 7: end if 8 :
set endflag = 0 10:
while endflag = 1 do 11: l j sends ''Chain'' messages to its S neighbor 12: if any node ∈ S neighbor reply l j then 13: l j randomly chooses a node l k ∈ S neighbor 14:
l k connects with l j 15:
l j sets to silent mode 16 :
else 19: set endflag = 1 20: end if 21: end while 22: end for 23: end for receive later; node 4 will repeat the process of node 3. Meanwhile, node 9 receives two ''Join'' messages, so it will choose the child node by their energy.
After a tail node broadcasts the ''Chain'' messages for a certain period without any reply, it will notify the past parent node that the establishment of this chain has been completed. Node 8 is a tail node and cannot find any leaf node to be its child. Thus, node 8 notifies node 2 by broadcasting the message of ''Over''. The intention of using broadcast are the tail nodes need to foremost send the data fragments to other tail nodes after slicing. Namely, each tail node needs to highlight the tail nodes in its neighbors. When other tail nodes which formed in earlier receive this ''Over'' message, they could flag the sender as a tail node. On the other hand, the leaf nodes which have not yet involved in the chains-building phase also need to keep this ''Over'' message temporarily, because they might become the tail node later. Node 2 has all ''Chain'' messages that are broadcast by its child nodes, so it can know which leaf nodes are dormant during the chains-building phase (any node broadcasts the ''Chain'' messages is an indication of it is active). After receiving the ''Over'' message, node 2 finds node 6 is dormant and selects node 6 to build a new chain. However, if there exists more than one dormant node, node 2 should randomly select a node. The phase of chains continues until all leaf child nodes are involved, or exceeds the maximum execution time. 
2) THE SLICING-MERGING PHASE
In this phase, a tail node needs to slice its raw data into a fixed number J (2 ≤ J ) of fragments. One is saved for itself, the rest (J − 1) of the fragments which composed of fake fragments and real fragments are transmitted to its neighbor nodes later. There is a counter in each node, which contributes to recording the number of data exchanges.
As for the value of J , there are two methods to initialize it in each node. (1) Applying the offline method that presets the J in each node, it is energy-efficiency but hard to reset the J ;
(2) Applying online method that BS claims and broadcasts the J . Take advantage of tree-building phase; each node can obtain the J from its parent node. The online method consumes more energy, yet provides flexibility.
As Fig. 6 shows, D a denotes the data of node a, f a,b denotes the fragment of data that is transmitted from node a to node b. We set each tail node slices its data into 3 fragments and transmits 2 fragments to their neighbor nodes. Node 6 had received one fragment from node 10 before slicing (although f 10,6 is a fake fragment), so it merely needs to slice its data into 2 fragments. After a node receives all the data fragments, it eliminates the fake fragments and merges the real fragments with its data.
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The data of n i = D i 3:
D 0 is a all zero fragment 4 :
Neighbor set nei all 6:
for j = 1; n < N fake ; j + + do 7: generateFake(D j f ); 8: end for 9 :
Each D f broadcasts to neighbor nodes nei f ; 10: nei all = nei all − nei f 11:
N real = J − N fake 12:
for k = 1; k < N real and k < nei all ; k + + do 13 :
if D k r = null then 16: Send D 0 to a neighbor node in nei all 17: 
Di.
The tail nodes transmit their data to the parent node; the non-tail nodes need to aggregate their data with all the received data and transmit the results to the parent node. Fig. 7 depicts an instance of the aggregation phase, node 10 sends D 10 to node 5, node 5 aggregates D 10 and transmits D 5 = D 5 + D 10 to node 1. In the end, all aggregation data arrive at the BS.
4) THE MECHANISM OF FAKE FRAGMENTS
Setup: Aim to mitigate the risk of drastically decreasing the number of sliced-nodes. We design the mechanism of the fake fragments to interfere adversaries. During the stage of key distribution (see section III-C), if two nodes A and B successfully establish a secure link, node A generates a key set in the form of matrix shown as below (where r i A is a prime number):
Share: Node A shares its K and ID to node B. Node B leverages the Eq.5 (where i is the maximum raw index of K ) to determine which key pair k should be used in the K .
Execute: In the slicing-merging phase, each node slices its data to J fragments. The number of fake fragments (within [0, J /2 ]) is randomly selected by the nodes in each round. Supposing the node A is a tail node, it needs to send 1 data fragment f A,B node B. If the value of f A,B satisfies Eq. 6, then f A,B is a fake fragment. Meanwhile, node B also has r i A and r i B , f A,B can be identified correctly by node B. Take Fig. 8 as a numerical example, suppose the value of f A,B is 15, and the key pair is (13, 2) . Because 15 satisfies the equation, namely, 15 mod 13 = 2, then this fragment is identified as a fake one. To adversaries, the fake and real fragments have the same packet format and value range, adversaries cannot discriminate them directly.
Update: After a certain period T , node A needs to update the key pair that be used between node A and node B. Therefore, node A chooses the new index j of the key pair and uses Eq.7 to encode it as E(j), then node A sends E(j) to node B. Node B will decode E(j) by Eq. 8 and update the key pair (k in Eq. 7 and 8 indicates the index of the key pair before updating).
a: FEASIBILITY DISCUSSION
There exist two issues before implementing the mechanism of fake fragments. (1) Whether there always exists at least one feasible fragmentation scheme for the real data of each tail node. (2) The probability of the real data fragment meets the Eq. 6 during the data slicing. Regarding issue one, because the technology of data slicing demands that each node keeps one fragment for itself. Accordingly, there certainly exists one feasible scheme that we can slice the real data of a node N d as [N d , 0, 0, . . . , 0]. N d is kept for itself, and the rest of the fragments are transmitted to neighbor nodes.
We now discuss on issue two, assume that each sensing data has the same probability of occurrence. Therefore, the probability of the real data fragments meet the Eq. 6 can be described as Eq. 9, where 2 R denotes the maximum bit of the sensing data is R, r i A denotes the i-th r A (i ≤ S) within the range [5,max(2 R ,100)], r j B denotes the j-th r B within the range [1, r i A ]. According to Eq. 9, if R = 7 (i.e., the maximum data is [1111111]=127) and the sensing data is always greater than or equal to 0, then P meet is 2.02%, which is very small.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, according to [26] , simulations are implemented for analysing, and performance comparison of SMART, PECDA, TAG [27] and CBDA. The experimental environment is an Intel Core i7-4720 with a clock frequency of 2.60 GHz, a memory size of 16 GB, Windows 7 OS, Java, and Matlab. In each run of simulations, we set the default parameters: the size of the network area is 300m × 300m, and there exist 400 sensor nodes that are deployed in this network randomly. Each tail node in the network should slice its data into J = 3 fragments. Each experimental data that we exhibit subsequently is the average result of 10 runs. Furthermore, as Fig. 9 shows, the networks that we consider in the simulations are divided into two types: (1) the random distribution network (RDN) and (2) non-random distribution network (NDN). The complete simulation parameters are shown in Table 1 . The performance metrics used in the simulations are privacy preservation, communication overhead, energy consumption, and data accuracy. 
A. PRIVACY PRESERVATION OF CBDA
In the CBDA algorithm, any sensor node that receives the data query form the BS needs to start the data collection. After that, the tail nodes slice their data into J fragments. one fragment is saved for themselves, j f fake fragments and j r real fragments (j f + j r = J − 1) are sent to their neighbor nodes. Meanwhile, a node might receive k fragments. b denotes the probability of one link that belongs to a node is broken. P c denotes the probability of one fragment is fake or real. Then the formula for the exposure probability of private data in a node can be presented as follows: where P(real = j r ) denotes the probability that the number of real fragments for a node is J r . The CBDA reduces the number of nodes that need to slice their data, which incurs the remarkable decrease in the data traffic as well as the chance of being eavesdropped. Moreover, because the data fragments of one node is a mixture of fake and real, the adversaries are unable to guarantee that the data they obtain is correct unless they compromise all k nodes that associate with this node. Fig. 10 shows that the exposure probability of CBDA is always lower than that in SMART and PECDA. The tendency of the curve for the CBDA raises smoothly, which demonstrates the robustness of privacy preservation in the CBDA. To sum up, the CBDA outperforms the existing algorithms and effectively withstands the attacks of eavesdropping (low exposure probability) and collusion (can tolerate up to k − 1 malicious nodes).
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF CBDA
In the CBDA algorithm, there exist N nodes in the network. Because of the mechanism of fake fragments, a node n i needs to transmit the key set. We denote the size of each key set by S KS , and the number of neighbor nodes that belong to n i is num i . Thus the communication overhead for preparation of fake fragments C fake is
In the topology formation phase of the CBDA, suppose that there have num leaf leaf nodes after the tree-building phase and num tail tail nodes after the chains-building phase. The size of all kinds of messages is S t . Thus, we describe the energy consumption of the topology formation phase as follows.
In the slicing-merging and aggregation phase, we denote the number of the tail nodes by num tail , the number of fragments for each tail node t i is J , the size of data fragment is S, and also the aggregation data is of the same size. Thus the communication overhead with z runs C data is described as follows.
And the total communication overhead of the CBDA with z runs can be concluded as follows.
where α is the frequency of updating the key set for a node with its neighbor nodes. We compare the communication overhead of three algorithms by varying the number of data fragments J , the total number of nodes N (e.g., when we alter the default N that between 200 to 1000, the J stays the same as Table 1 ). Each evaluation figure is divided into (a) and (b) to represent the circumstances of that in RDN and NDN respectively. In Fig. 11, 12 , the CBDA shows the lowest communication overhead in these algorithms. In Fig. 11 , with the increment of J , the SMART and the PECDA have a large number of nodes to slice their data, the communication overhead of them increases obviously; with the increment of N , the communication overhead increment of SMART and PECDA has been drastic. Nevertheless, the CBDA (1) reduces the number of sliced nodes and (2) dynamically reduces the number of fragments for each tail node (if a tail node had received the data fragments from other nodes). The communication overhead of the CBDA is 50-70 % lower than the SMART and PECDA, and its changes are slight as J alters. In addition, the SMART and the PECDA in the NDN exhibit the higher communication overhead than the RDN. However, the CBDA is nearly unvarying.
C. ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF CBDA
The energy consumption can mainly fall into three categories: (1) message transmission, (2) operations of encryption/decryption, and (3) computation. The operations of encryption/decryption are needed for data transmission. The energy consumption of computation primarily includes modulo operations and aggregation operations. The total energy consumption of the CBDA is
where E t and E r denotes the energy consumption of transmitting and receiving each bit of data. According to the formulation in [28] , which gives the energy used to transmit and receive one bit of data is E transmit = α + γ × d n , E receive = β. We adopt γ = 10pJ/bit/m 2 , α = 45nJ/bit, β = 135nJ/bit, and n = 2. The initial energy of each sensor node is 100J, and sleep energy is 11mW/ms.
We first evaluate the performance of the energy-based selection method on tail nodes. As Fig. 13 shows, the network remains the energy-balance distribution to a certain extent. There are only a few deep blue areas (which means a low energy level). The majority are maintained as the normal energy level. In other words, the CBDA successfully chooses the high energy level nodes to be the tail nodes, which renders the slicing mechanism can work as long as possible. The simulation results of energy consumption are shown in Fig. 14, 15 . The CBDA needs to consume more energy on the mechanism of fake fragments and the topology formation phase. Therefore, when the N is lower than 200, the performance of CBDA is similar to other algorithms (slight improvement). However, with the increment of N , the consumptions of SMART and PECDA rise extremely. CBDA has the lowest energy consumption, which reduces about 15% to 50% than the PECDA. That is because the transmission/reception operations account for a large proportion of energy consumption; the SMART and PECDA have more nodes to perform slicing phase. Meanwhile, Fig. 14 shows that even the CBDA sets J to 5 (a high protection level, according to [1] ), the energy consumption is also acceptable. Based on these figures, the CBDA is feasible for the restricted environment (which can be proved by the (b)s in each figure) and can be applied in the network of any scale.
D. DATA ACCURACY
The accuracy of the aggregation data is 100% in ideal conditions. Nevertheless, owing to features of channel sharing in WSN, data loss is unavoidable during the transmission. The more transmissions per duration in the network, the more collisions and then the more data loss [2] .
In Fig. 16 , the x-axis indicates the given duration of aggregation for the network in one run. Because the TAG without any security protocols (such as data slicing-mixing) to protect the data privacy, the TAG has the lowest data traffic and the probability of data collision. The CBDA reduces the data traffic as well as the probability of data collision than existing privacy-preserving algorithms. When the duration is lower than 6 seconds, these three schemes show a similar performance of accuracy. After the aggregation duration is sufficient (more than 15 seconds), the TAG has the best accuracy in these algorithms. The highest accuracy of the CBDA is about 85%, which is about 5% higher than the PECDA and closes to the TAG.
VI. CONCLUSION
Data aggregation is a fundamental and effective algorithm for wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a novel aggregation algorithm CBDA. In the CBDA, sensor nodes will be organized as a tree topology, then the leaf nodes of the tree connect with each other to form many chains. The energy consumption of the data slicing can benefit from the changes of topology in this paper. Also, we utilize the mechanism of fake fragments to strengthen the preservation of data privacy further. The CBDA is designed under the ''semi-honest model,'' it can withstand the eavesdropping attack and tolerate the collusion attack of k (k ≤ n − 1) malicious nodes.
The simulation results and analysis prove that when compared to existing privacy-preserving aggregation algorithms, our algorithm achieves energy-efficient while keeping a better performance of the privacy protection. When compared to the TAG, CBDA has a similar performance in accuracy. In the future, we will focus on the designing of a new privacy-preserving data aggregation algorithm with the capability of decreasing useless or redundant messages in the network. SIMIN HU received the bachelor's degree from Anhui Agricultural University, China, in 2019. He is currently pursuing the master's degree with the College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, China. His research interests include the IoT security, system security, and protocol security.
LIANG LIU received the B.S. degree in computer science from Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, Shanxi, China, in 2005, and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China, in 2012. He is currently an Assistant Professor with the College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. His research interests include distributed computing, big data, and system security.
LIMING FANG received the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, in 2012. He was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the information security with the City University of Hong Kong. He is currently an Associate Professor with the School of Computer Science, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He has published more than 50 articles in his field, including the IEEE TDSC, the IEEE TIFS, Theoretical Computer Science, Designs Codes and Cryptography, and Information Sciences. His current research interests include cryptography and information security. RENJUN YE received the bachelor's degree from Anhui Agricultural University, China, in 2019. He is currently pursuing the master's degree with the College of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, China. His research interest includes cybersecurity. VOLUME 8, 2020 
